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Abstract—In this paper, we study a multi-user multiple-input-
multiple-output secrecy simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) channel which consists of one trans-
mitter, one cooperative jammer (CJ), multiple energy receivers
(potential eavesdroppers, ERs), and multiple co-located receivers
(CRs). We exploit the dual of artificial noise (AN) generation
for facilitating efficient wireless energy transfer and secure
transmission. Our aim is to maximize the minimum harvested
energy among ERs and CRs subject to secrecy rate constraints for
each CR and total transmit power constraint. By incorporating
norm-bounded channel uncertainty model, we propose a iterative
algorithm based on sequential parametric convex approximation
to find a near-optimal solution. Finally, simulation results are
presented to validate the performance of the proposed algorithm
outperforms that of the conventional AN-aided scheme and CJ-
aided scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless power transfer (WPT) has been a promis-
ing paradigm to scavenge energy from the radio frequency
(RF) signals [1]. As a key technology for really perpet-
ual communications, simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) has been an promising of interests
in RF-enabled signal to provide power supplies for wireless
networks, which have been studied in various scenarios [2]-[5].
On the other hand, secrecy transmission, especially physical-
layer security (PLS), has extracted more and more attentions
in 5G wireless networks [6].
Specifically, PLS has been recognized as a important issue
for SWIPT system due to its inherent characteristics make the
wireless information more vulnerable to eavesdropping [7]-
[11]. Moreover, the secure transmission with SWIPT schemes
has also been investigated in the multi-user multiple-input-
multiple-output (MU-MIMO) broadcasting [9].
It is noted that the assumption that perfect channel state in-
formation (CSI) is available at the transmitter in [2]-[4] [7]-[9].
In practice, it is not always possible to obtain perfect CSI at the
transmitter due to the channel errors. Secure communication
with SWIPT would be more challenging with imperfect CSI at
the transmitter. Some robust optimization techniques have been
constructed to secrecy SWIPT transmission under imperfect
channel realization in [10][11] [13]-[18]. Considering the
SWIPT scheme, an optimal transmit covariance matrix robust
design has been proposed for MIMO secure channels with
multi-antenna eavesdroppers [11].
In addition, some of state-of-art techniques have been devel-
oped to introduce more interference to the eavesdroppers [12]-
[21]. Artificial noise (AN) technique has been used to embed
the transmit beamforming to confuse the eavesdropper [12]. In
secrecy SWIPT systems, AN plays both the roles of an energy-
carrying signal for WPT and protecting the secrecy informa-
tion transmission, which has been considered as interfering
the eavesdropper and harvesting power simultaneously in [13]-
[15]. In addition, to further increase the secrecy rates, jamming
node has been introduced in the secrecy networks, which has
the capability to improve the legitimate user’s performance
and prevent the eavesdroppers from intercepting the intended
messages [16]-[20]. Based on the worst-case scheme, cooper-
ative jamming signal was generated by a external cooperative
jammer (CJ) node to interfere the eavesdropper and improve
the secrecy rate in multiple-input-single-output (MISO) secure
SWIPT system with wiretap channels[18].
When information receivers (IRs) and energy-harvesting
receivers (ERs) are placed in a same cell, the ERs are normally
assumed to be closer to the transmitter compared with IRs.
This gives rise to a new information security issue in the
SWIPT systems. In such a situation, ERs have a possibility
of eavesdropping the information sent to the IRs, and thus
can become potential eavesdroppers [8] [14] [15].
In this paper, considering SWIPT, we investigate a secure
transmission design problem in MU-MIMO secrecy system
with one multi-antenna transmitter, one multi-antenna CJ,
multiple single-antenna co-located receiver (CR), and multiple
multi-antenna ER. The CR employs power splitting (PS)
scheme to split the received signals into two streams for ID
and energy harvesting (EH) simultaneously. Unlike [17] [18],
our objective is to maximize the minimum of harvested energy
(max-min HE) of both ERs and CRs subject to secrecy rate
constraints for each CR and total transmit power constraint.
Assuming the imperfect CSI case, we seek to the optimal
transmission strategy to jointly optimize the AN-aided beam-
forming, the AN vector, the CJ vector and the PS ratio design.
Considering the worst-case scheme by incorporating the
norm-bounded channel uncertainty model, we derive equiv-
alent forms of secrecy rate constraint and the minimum of
harvested energy. An iterative algorithm based on sequential
parametric convex approximation (SPCA) is also addressed
to recover a high quality rank-one beamforming solution to
the original problem. Finally, the performance analysis are
provided to verify that the proposed algorithm outperforms
the conventional scheme.
Notation: ⊗ defines the Kronecker product. CM×L and
HM×L describe the space of M × L complex matrices and
Hermitian matrices, respectively. H+ equals the set of positive
semi-definite Hermitian matrices, and R+ denotes the set of
all nonnegative real numbers. For a matrix A, A  0 means
that A is positive semi-definite, and ‖A‖F , tr(A), |A| and
rank(A) denote the Frobenius norm, trace, determinant, and
the rank, respectively. vec(A) stacks the elements of A in a
column vector. 0M×L is a null matrix with M × L size. E{·}
describes expectation, and ℜ{·} stands for the real part of
a complex number. [x]+ represents max{x, 0} and λmax(A)
indicates the maximum eigenvalue of A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we consider a MU-MIMO secrecy channel,
which consists of one multi-antenna transmitter, one multi-
antenna CJ, K single-antenna CRs, and L multi-antenna ERs,
where the CR employs the PS scheme to decode information
and exploit power simultaneously. It is assumed that the
transmitter and the CJ are equipped with NT and NJ transmit
antennas, and each ER has NE receive antennas. We denote
hk ∈ CNT as the channel vector between the transmitter and
the k-th CR, Hl ∈ CNT×NE as the channel matrix between
the transmitter and the l-th ER, gk ∈ CNJ as the channel
vector between the CJ and the k-th CR, Gl ∈ CNJ×NE as the
channel matrix between the CJ and the l-th ER, respectively.
In order to improve the reliable transmission, the transmitter
employs the transmit beamforming with AN, which acts as
interference to the ERs and simultaneously provides energy to
the CRs and ERs. Thus, the transmitter sends the confidential
message xk by using transmit beamforming with AN to the
k-th CR as
xk = wksk + z, (1)
where wk ∈ CNT denotes the linear beamforming vector
for the k-th CR at the transmitter, sk ∈ C represents the
information-bearing signal intended for the k-th CR satisfying
E{|sk|2} = 1, and z ∈ CNT is the energy-carrying AN vector,
which can also be composed by multiple energy beams. The
received signal at the k-th CR and the l-th ER can be expressed
as
yk = h
H
k
∑K
k=1
wksk+h
H
k z+g
H
k qsJ+nk, k = 1, ...,K,
yl=H
H
l
∑K
k=1
wksk+H
H
l z+G
H
l qsJ+nl, l = 1, ..., L,
(2)
where sJ is the cooperative jamming signal introduced by the
CJ satisfying E{|sJ |2} = 1, q ∈ CNJ indicates the CJ vector,
nk ∼ CN (0, σ2k) and nl ∼ CN (0, σ2l I) stand for the additive
Gaussian noise by the receive antenna at the k-th CR and the
l-th ER. In addition, each CR considers the PS scheme to
manage the processes of ID and EH simultaneously. Based on
this reason, the received signal at the k-th CR is divided into
ID and EH by PS ratio ρk ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, the received signal
for ID at the k-th CR can be given as
yIDk =
√
ρkyk+np,k
=
√
ρk
(
hHk
∑K
k=1
wksk + h
H
k z+g
H
k qsJ+nk
)
+np,k, ∀k,
(3)
where np,k ∼ CN (0, δ2k) is the antenna noise introduced by
signal process of the ID at the k-th CR [2].
We denoteWk = wkw
H
k as the transmit covariance matrix,
Z = zzH as the AN covariance matrix, and Q = qqH as the
CJ covariance matrix. Hence, the achieved secrecy rate can be
calculated by
Rˆk =
[
log2
(
1 + SINRk
)−max
l
Cl,k
]+
, ∀k, (4)
where
SINRk=
ρkh
H
k Wkhk
ρk(σ2k + h
H
k (
∑
j 6=k Wj + Z)hk + g
H
k Qgk) + δ
2
k
,
Cl,k=log2
∣∣I+(HHl ZHl+GHl QGl+σ2l I)−1HHl WkHl∣∣.
Thus, the harvested power at the k-th CR and the l-th ER are
written as
Ec,k=ηc,k(1−ρk)
(
hHk
(∑K
j=1
Wk+Z
)
hk+g
H
k Qgk+σ
2
k
)
,
Ee,l=ηe,l
(
tr(HHl (
∑K
k=1
Wk+Z)Hl)+tr(G
H
l QGl)+NEσ
2
l
)
,
(5)
where ηc,k and ηe,l denote the energy conversion efficiency of
the k-th CR and the l-th ER.
Due to channel estimation and quantization errors, it may
not be possible to achieve the perfect CSI at the transmitter
in practice. In this section, our aim is to jointly optimize
the max-min worst-case HE formulation at the imperfect CSI
case. Now, we adopt the imperfect CSI case under the norm-
bounded channel uncertainty model [11][13][14]. Specifically,
the actual channels hk, Hl, gk, and Gl can be given as
hk = h¯k+ek, ∀k, Hl = H¯l+El, ∀l,
gk = g¯k+e˜k, ∀k, Gl = G¯l+E˜l, ∀l,
(6)
where h¯k, g¯k, H¯l, and G¯l denote the estimated channel avail-
able at the transmitter and the CJ, respectively, and ek, e˜k,El,
and E˜l are the channel errors, bounded as ‖ek‖2 ≤ εk,
‖e˜k‖2 ≤ ε˜k, ‖El‖F ≤ θl, and ‖E˜l‖F ≤ θ˜l, respectively.
In this paper, our aim is to maximize the minimum of the to-
tal harvested power among the all CRs and ERs subject to the
secrecy rate constraint and the total transmit power constraint
at the transmitter and the CJ power constraint. By taking the
above channel model into account, the transmit beamforming
design is formulated as a multi-object optimization problem
which can be given by
max
ρk,{Wk},Z,Q
Eˆc,k + Eˆe,l (7a)
s.t. min
‖ek‖ ≤ εk
‖e˜k‖ ≤ ε˜k
Ck− max‖El‖F ≤ θl
‖E˜l‖F ≤ θ˜l
Cl ≥ R¯s, ∀k, (7b)
∑K
k=1
tr(Wk)+tr(Z) ≤ PT , tr(Q) ≤ PJ , (7c)
1 ≥ ρk > 0, Wk  0, Z  0, Q  0, rank(Wk) = 1, (7d)
where
Eˆc,k , min
‖ek‖≤εk,‖e˜k‖≤ε˜k
min
c,k
τEk, ∀k,
Eˆe,l , min
‖Ee,l‖F≤θl,‖E˜l‖F≤θ˜l
min
l
(1− τ)Ee,l, ∀l,
τ is the priority parameter, R¯s stands for a given secrecy rate
threshold, and PT and PJ denote the available power budget
at the transmitter and the CJ, respectively. Variable τ ≥ 0
reflects the preference of the system operator. Problem (7) is
non-convex due to the secrecy rate constraint and the objective
function, and thus cannot be solved directly.
III. PROPOSED ROBUST DESIGN METHOD
In order to circumvent the roust max-min HE problem, we
transform problem (7) by introducing two slack variables E¯s
and E¯e into
max
ρk,{Wk},Z,Q, E¯s, E¯e
τE¯s + (1− τ)E¯e (8a)
s.t. min
‖ek‖≤εk,‖e˜k‖≤ε˜k
min
k
Ec,k ≥ E¯s, ∀k, (8b)
min
‖El‖F≤θl,‖E˜l‖F≤θ˜l
min
l
Ee,l ≥ E¯e, ∀l, (8c)
(7b), (7c), (7d).
Problem (8) is still non-convex in terms of (8b), (8c) and (7b).
Now, let us consider another formulation of problem (7)
based on SPCA method [22]. The optimization framework
can also be recast as a convex form by incorporating channel
uncertainties. First, by applying the matrix inequality |I+A| ≥
1 + tr(A) [23], the robust secrecy rate constraint (7b) can be
relaxed as
Ck − log2
(
1+
tr
(
HHl WkHl
)
σ2l +tr
(
HHl ZHl+G
H
l QGl
)
)
≥ R¯s. (9)
To make the constraint (9) tractable, we introduce two slack
variables r1 > 0 and r2 > 0, the robust secrecy rate (9) can
be equivalently relaxed as
log(r1r2) ≥ R¯s, (10a)
1+
ρkh
H
k Wkhk
ρk( σ2k+h
H
k (
∑
j 6=k Wj+Z)hk + g
H
k Qgk)+δ
2
k
≥r1,(10b)
1 +
tr
(
HHl WkHl
)
σ2l + tr
(
HHl ZHl+G
H
l QGl
) ≤ 1
r2
, ∀l. (10c)
Then, we can be further simplify (10) as
r1r2 ≥ 2R¯s , (11a)
hHk Wkhk
σ2k + h
H
k (
∑
j 6=kWj+Z)hk + g
H
k Qgk +
δ2
k
ρk
≥ r1−1, ∀l,(11b)
σ2l + tr
(
HHl ZHl+G
H
l QGl
)
σ2l + tr
(
HHl (Z+Wk)Hl+G
H
l QGl
) ≥ r2, ∀k. (11c)
The inequality constraint (11a) is equivalent to 2R¯s+2 +
(r1 − r2)2 ≤ (r1 + r2)2, which can be converted into a conic
quadratic-representable function form as
∥∥∥[√2R¯s+2 r1 − r2
]∥∥∥ ≤ r1 + r2. (12)
Design H¯k , h¯
H
k h¯k, G¯k , g¯
H
k g¯k, Hˆl , H¯
H
l H¯l, and Gˆl ,
G¯Hl G¯l. The inequalities in (11b) and (11c) can be rearranged,
respectively, which give
σ2k+
∑
j 6=k
wHj (H¯k+∆k)wj+z
H(H¯k+∆k)z+q
H(G¯k+Φk)q
+
δ2k
ρk
≤ w
H
k (H¯k+∆k)wk
r1 − 1 , ∀k, (13a)
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+Υl)z+w
H
k (Hˆl+Υl)wk+q
H(Gˆl+Ψl)q
≤ σ
2
l +z
H(Hˆl+Υl)z+q
H(Gˆl+Ψl)q
r2
, ∀l, (13b)
where ∆k = h¯ke
H
k + ekh¯
H
k + eke
H
k , Φk = g¯ke˜
H
k + e˜kg¯
H
k +
e˜ke˜
H
k , Υl = H¯lE
H
l + ElH¯
H
l + ElE
H
l , and Ψl = G¯lE˜
H
l +
E˜lG¯
H
l + E˜lE˜
H
l . which stand for the CSI uncertainty. It is
straightforward to show that
‖∆k‖F ≤ ‖h¯keHk ‖F + ‖ekh¯Hk ‖F + ‖ekeHk ‖F
≤ ‖h¯k‖‖eHk ‖+ ‖ek‖‖h¯Hk ‖+‖ek‖2
= ε2k + 2εk‖h¯k‖,
(14)
‖Φk‖F ≤ ‖g¯ke˜Hk ‖F + ‖e˜kg¯Hk ‖F + ‖e˜ke˜Hk ‖F
≤ ‖g¯k‖‖e˜Hk ‖+ ‖e˜k‖‖g¯Hk ‖+‖e˜k‖2
= ε˜2k + 2ε˜k‖g¯k‖,
(15)
‖Υl‖F ≤ ‖H¯lEHl ‖F+‖ElH¯Hl ‖F+‖ElEHl ‖F
≤ ‖H¯l‖F ‖EHl ‖F +El‖F ‖H¯Hl ‖F+‖El‖2F
= θ2l + 2θl‖H¯l‖F ,
(16)
‖Ψl‖F ≤ ‖G¯lE˜Hl ‖F+‖E˜lG¯Hl ‖F+‖E˜lE˜Hl ‖F
≤ ‖G¯l‖F ‖E˜Hl ‖F + ‖E˜l‖F ‖G¯Hl ‖F+‖E˜l‖2F
= θ˜2l + 2θ˜l‖G¯l‖F .
(17)
Note that ∆k, Φk, Υl, and Ψl are norm-bounded matrices as
‖∆k‖F ≤ ξk, ‖Φk‖F ≤ ξ˜k, ‖Υl‖F ≤ αl, and ‖Ψl‖F ≤ α˜l,
where ξk = ε
2
k + 2εk‖h¯k‖, ξ˜k = ε˜2k + 2ε˜k‖g¯k‖, αl = θ2l +
2θl‖H¯l‖F , and α˜l = θ˜2l + 2θ˜l‖G¯l‖F .
According to [24], we can minimize constraint (11b) by
maximizing the left-hand side (LHS) of (13a) while minimiz-
ing its the right-hand side (RHS). Then (13a) and (13b) can
be approximately rewritten as, respectively,
max
‖∆k‖F≤ξk,‖Φk‖F≤ξ˜k
σ2k+
∑
j 6=k
wHj (H¯k+∆k)wj+z
H(H¯k+∆k)z
+qH(G¯k+Φk)q+
δ2k
ρk
≤ min
‖∆k‖F≤ξk
wHk (H¯k+∆k)wk
r1 − 1 , ∀k,
(18)
max
‖Υl‖F≤αl,‖Ψl‖F≤α˜l
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+Υl)z+w
H
k (Hˆl +Υl)wk
+qH(Gˆl +Ψl)q
≤ min
‖Υl‖F≤αl,‖Ψl‖F≤α˜l
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+Υl)z+q
H(Gˆl+Ψl)q
r2
, ∀l.
(19)
In order to minimize the RHS of (18) and (19), a loose
approximation [24] is applied, which gives
min
‖∆k‖F≤ξk
wHk (H¯k+∆k)wk
r1 − 1 ≥
wHk (H¯k − ξkI)wk
r1 − 1 , ∀k,
min
‖Υl‖F≤αl,‖Ψl‖F≤α˜l
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+Υl)z+q
H(Gˆl+Ψl)q
r2
≥ σ
2
l +z
H(Hˆl−αlI)z+qH(Gˆl−α˜lI)q
r2
.
(20)
Using similar technique to the LHS of (18) and (19) yields
max
‖∆k‖F≤ξk,‖Φk‖F≤ξ˜k
σ2k+
∑
j 6=k
wHj (H¯k+∆k)wj+z
H(H¯k
+∆k)z+q
H(G¯k+Φk)q+
δ2k
ρk
≤ σ2k+
∑
j 6=k
wHj (H¯k+ξkI)wj
+zH(H¯k+ξkI)z+q
H(G¯k+ ξ˜kI)q+
δ2k
ρk
, ∀k,
(21)
max
‖Υl‖F≤αl,‖Ψl‖F≤α˜l
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+Υl)z+w
H
k (Hˆl+Υl)wk
+qH(Gˆl+Ψl)q ≤ σ2l +zH(Hˆl+αlI)z
+wHk (Hˆl+αlI)wk+q
H(Gˆl+α˜lI)q, ∀l.
(22)
From (18)-(22), (13a) and (13b) can be given as, respec-
tively,
σ2k +
∑
j 6=k
wHj (H¯k+ξkI)wj+z
H(H¯k+ξkI)z
+qH(G¯k+ ξ˜kI)q+
δ2k
ρk
≤ w
H
k H¯ξs,kwk
r1 − 1 , ∀k,
(23)
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+αlI)z+w
H
k (Hˆl+αlI)wk+q
H(Gˆl+α˜lI)q
≤ σ
2
l +z
HHˆξe,lz+q
HGˆξ˜e,lq
r2
, ∀k, l,
(24)
where H¯ξs,k = H¯k−ξkI, Hˆξe,l= Hˆl−αlI and Gˆξ˜e,l= Gˆl−
α˜lI. We observe that these two constraints are non-convex,
but the RHS of both (23) and (24) have the function form of
quadratic-over-linear, which are convex functions [25]. Based
on the idea of the constrained convex procedure [22], these
quadratic-over-linear functions can be replaced by their first-
order expansions, which transforms the problem into convex
programming. Specifically, we define
fA,a(w, t) =
wHAw
t− a , (25)
where A  0 and t ≥ a. At a certain point (w˜, t˜), the first-
order Taylor expansion of (25) is given by
FA,a(w, t, w˜, t˜) =
2ℜ{w˜HAw}
t˜− a −
w˜HAw˜
(t˜− a)2 (t− a). (26)
By using the above results of Taylor expansion, for the
points (w˜k, r˜1), (z˜, r˜2) and (q˜, r˜2), we can transform (23)
and (24) into convex forms, respectively, as
σ2k +
∑
j 6=k
wHj (H¯k+ξkI)wj+z
H(H¯k+ξkI)z+q
H(G¯k
+ξ˜kI)q +
δ2k
ρk
≤ FH¯ξs,k,1(wk, r1, w˜k, r˜1), (27a)
σ2l +z
H(Hˆl+αlI)z+w
H
k (Hˆl+αlI)wk+q
H(Gˆl+α˜lI)q ≤
σ2l (
2
r˜2
− r2
r˜22
)+F
Hˆξe,l,0
(z, r2, z˜, r˜2)+FGˆ
ξ˜e,l
,0
(q, r2, q˜, r˜2).(27b)
In order to approximate the EH constraint (8b) and (8c) to
convex one, we apply an SCA-based method. First, by using
a loose approximation approach for (8b) and (8c), we have
ηc,k(1−ρk)(
∑K
j=1
wHj
(
H¯k+∆k)wj+z
H(H¯k+∆k)z
+qH(G¯k+Φk)q+ σ
2
k
) ≥ E¯s, ∀k, (28a)
zH(Hˆl+Υl)z+
∑K
j=1
wHk (Hˆl+Υl)wk + q
H(Gˆl+Ψl)q
≥ Eˇe−NEσ2l , ∀l, (28b)
where Eˇe =
E¯e
ηe,l
.
Using loose approximation [24] to the LHS of (28a) and
(28b) yields
ηc,k(1−ρk)
(∑K
j=1
wHj (H¯k−ξkI)wj+zH(H¯k−ξkI)z
+qH(G¯k− ξ˜kI)q + σ2k
) ≥ E¯s, ∀k, (29a)
zH(Hˆl−αlI)z+
∑K
j=1
wHk (Hˆl−αlI)wk
+qH(Gˆl+α˜lI)q ≥ Eˇe−NEσ2l , ∀l. (29b)
It is observed that wHj (H¯k−ξkI)wj , zH(H¯k−ξkI)z and
qH(G¯k− ξ˜kI)q are the concave part of constraints (29a) and
(29b). In order to make (29a) and (29b) more tractable, we
employ the SCA technique for (29a) and (29b) to obtain
convex approximations.
Firstly, we take zH(H¯k−ξkI)z as an example. Let z˜ be an
initial feasible point. We substitute z= z˜+∆z into zH(H¯k−
ξkI)z as follows
zH(H¯k−ξkI)z
=(z˜+∆z)HH¯ξs,k(z˜+∆z)
≥z˜HH¯ξs,kz˜+ 2ℜ{z˜HH¯ξs,k∆z},
(30)
where (30) are derived by dropping the quadratic form
∆zHH¯ξs,k∆z.
Then, defining w˜k and q˜ as initial feasible point. Substi-
tuting wk = w˜k+∆wk, ∀k, z = z˜+∆z, and q = q˜+∆q
into the LHS of (29a) and (29b). Then, we can use the the
similar method with (30) to achieve linear approximations of
the concave constraints (29a) and (29b), respectively, as
ηc,kak(1−ρk) ≥ E¯s, ∀k, (31a)∑K
j=1
[
w˜Hj Hˆξe,lw˜j+2ℜ{w˜Hj H¯ξe,l∆wj}
]
+2ℜ{z˜HH¯ξe,l∆z}
+˜zHH¯ξe,lz˜+q˜
HGˆξ˜e,lq˜+2ℜ{q˜HGˆξ˜e,l∆q} ≥ Eˇe−NEσ2l , (31b)
where ak =
∑K
j=1
[
w˜Hj H¯ξs,kw˜j+2ℜ{w˜Hj H¯ξs,k∆wj}
]
+
z˜HH¯ξs,kz˜ + 2ℜ{z˜HH¯ξs,k∆z} + q˜HG¯ξ˜s,kq˜ +
2ℜ{q˜HG¯ξ˜s,k∆q} + σ2k and G¯ξ˜s,k = G¯k+ ξ˜kI. In addition,
it is noted that (31a) is still non-convex in its current form
since it involve coupled ak’s and 1− ρk’s. The first-order
Taylor expansion of
√
E¯s is es =
√
E˜s+0.5E˜
− 1
2
s (E¯s− E˜s).
Thus, (31a) can be rewritten to a convex second-order cones
(SOC) constraint as∥∥[2es/√ηc,k, ak + ρk − 1]∥∥ ≤ ak − ρk + 1. (32)
In addition, (7c) can be reformulated to two SOC forms as
∥∥[wT1 , ...,wTK , zT ]∥∥ ≤√PT , (33a)∥∥qT ∥∥ ≤√PJ . (33b)
Eventually, problem (7) is converted into the following
convex second order cone programming (SOCP) problem as
max
ρk,{wk},z,q, E˜s, E¯e, r1, r2
τE¯s + (1 − τ)E¯e
s.t. (12), (27a), (27b), (31b), (32), (33a), (33b), 0 < ρk ≤ 1.
(34)
Given {w˜k}, q˜, z˜, r˜1, r˜2, and E˜s problem (34) is convex
and can be solved by employing convex optimization software
tools such as CVX [26]. Based on the SPCA method, an ap-
proximation with the current optimal solution can be updated
iteratively, which implies that (7) is optimally solved.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide the simulation results to validate
the performance of our proposed schemes. We set that K = 2,
L = 2, M = 1, NT = 4, NJ = 4, and NE = 2.
We assume the estimated channel hk, Hl,gk, and Gl are
respectively modelled as hk=H(dk)hI , Hl = H(dl)HI ,
gk = H (fk )gI , and Gl = H (fl )GI , where hI ∼ CN (0, I),
HI ∼ CN (0, I), gk =∼ CN (0, I), and Gl =∼ CN (0, I),
H(dk) =
c
4pifc
( 1
dk
)
κ
2 . We define dk = 100 m and fk = 100 m
meters as the distance between the transmitter as well as the
CJ and all the CR, and dl = 9 m and fl = 9 m meters as the
distance between the transmitter as well as the CJ and all the
ER, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, c = 3 × 108ms−1
is the speed of light; fc = 900 MHz is the carrier frequency;
and κ = 2.7 is the path loss exponent. In addition, the noise
power at the CR is set to be σ2k = −90 dBm and δ2k = −50
dBm. Also the noise power of all the ERs is σ2k = −90 dBm,
∀k. Also we set the channel error bound for the deterministic
model as εs = εk = ε˜k, ∀k and εe = θl = θ˜l, ∀k. The EH
efficiency coefficients are set to ηc,k = ηe,l = 0.3 and the
priority parameter τ is 0.5.
In our simulations, we compare the following transmit
designs: the perfect CSI case, the proposed SOCP-SPCA
algorithm, the no-CJ scheme which is the robust design w/o
CJ by setting Q = 0 [15], the no-AN scheme which means
the robust design w/o CJ by setting Z = 0 [18], and the non-
robust method which is a scheme that assumes no uncertainty
in the CSI.
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Fig. 1. Average harvested power versus iteration numbers
Fig. 1 illustrates the convergence of the SOCP-SPCA
method with respect to iteration numbers for PT = 40 dBm,
PJ = 40 dBm, R¯s = 0.5 bps/Hz, and ε = 0.01, respectively.
It is easily seen that convergence of the SOCP-SPCA method
is achieved for all cases within just 5 iterations.
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Fig. 2. Average harvested power versus target secrecy rate
Fig. 2 shows the average harvested power in terms of
different target secrecy rates with PT = 30 dBm and PJ = 30
dBm, respectively. It is observed that the harvested power of
all schemes decline with the increase of the secrecy rate target.
Also, the performance gain of the scheme with ǫ = 0.01 over
the scheme with ǫ = 0.05 is 0.8 dB at all the target secrecy
rate region. Compared with the no-AN scheme and the no-CJ
scheme, the harvested power of the SOCP-SPCA algorithm are
6 dB and 9 dB higher. Moreover, we can check that the SOCP-
SPCA algorithm perform better than the non-robust scheme,
and the performance gap increases as the target secrecy rate
becomes large.
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Fig. 3. Average harvested power versus the power budget at the CJ
Fig. 3 depicts the average harvested power versus the power
budget at the CJ with PT = 10 dBm and R¯s = 0.5 bps/Hz,
respectively. It is easily observed that the achieved harvested
power increases with PJ , and the curves of the perfect CSI
case and the SOCP-SPCA algorithm increase with the same
slope. Moreover, we can check that as PJ increases, the
performance gap between the proposed algorithms and the no-
AN scheme becomes larger and the performance loss of the
non-robust scheme grows.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the robust secure beam-
forming design for a MU-MIMO SWIPT secrecy system with
the PS scheme by incorporating the norm-bounded channel
uncertainties. We aim to maximize the minimum of harvested
energy by jointly optimizing the AN-aided beamforming, the
AN vector, the CJ vector and the PS ratio design. To solve
the non-convex problem, we use the SPCA method, loose
approximation and SCA-based method to reformulate the
original problem as an convex SOCP problem. Also, an SPCA-
based iterative algorithm is also addressed. Finally, simulation
results have been provided to validate the performance of our
proposed algorithm. In addition, the proposed robust design
methods outperforms the non-robust schemes.
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